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I. INTRODUCTION
The mid-1990's has witnessed substantial merger and acquisition
activity. The total dollar volume of domestic mergers and acquisitions
announced for the years 1990 up to and including 1996 was $2.225 tril-
lion.' The total for 1996 alone was $658.8 billion.2 Various factors
have encouraged both friendly and hostile combinations. These include
continued positive responses from the equity markets as consolidations
are announced; increased corporate profits in a relatively strong econ-
omy marked by low inflation, which encourages companies to combine
in an effort to increase revenue growth; the ease of obtaining credit as
well as the availability of value-inflated stock to finance acquisitions;
growing pressure by institutional investors on boards of directors to
increase shareholder value; and the relative laxity with which the gov-
ernment has addressed anti-trust issues in the merger context. Further,
an increasing number of companies are combining in hopes of obtaining
synergies to expand market share as inexpensively as possible in order
to compete effectively in an increasingly consolidated national and inter-
national marketplace. As a consequence of this increased merger and
acquisition activity, corporations wishing to protect shareholder interests
from untimely or ill-advised acquisitions should be prepared in advance
to respond to unsolicited takeover proposals.
A target's board of directors may employ various defensive meas-
ures against an unsolicited acquisition proposal or offer. Some measures
* Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.
1. Charles V. Bagli, Conditions Are Right for a Takeover Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1997,
at C3.
2. Id.
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can best be implemented prior to the receipt of an unsolicited bid. Other
techniques may be employed in response to a threatened or actual hostile
bid after it has been made. Although courts traditionally grant broad
latitude to boards of directors in most circumstances, some courts, par-
ticularly those in Delaware, have engaged in a more searching inquiry
into the deliberative process behind and motivations underlying a target
board's decision to act defensively. Such higher level of scrutiny stems
from the perception that a potential conflict of interest exists where the
target's board may be faced with a choice between maintaining control
of the corporation or realizing an immediate premium over market value
for shareholders. This Article will discuss a range of defensive meas-
ures available to targets of unsolicited takeover proposals in light of the
enhanced scrutiny under which most courts evaluate the adoption of
such measures.
II. JUDICIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW OF DIRECTOR ACTION
In making business decisions, corporate directors are subject to
fiduciary duties requiring them to act in the best interests of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders: These fiduciary obligations include the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care is simply the duty, when
acting on the corporation's behalf, to act with the degree of care a rea-
sonable person would employ in similar circumstances.3 The duty of
loyalty is the duty to place the interests of the corporation and sharehold-
ers ahead of any self-interest.4 When addressing duty of loyalty ques-
tions, courts generally require that the transaction at issue be "entirely
fair" to the corporation. 5
The Business Judgment Rule In the Takeover Context. In determin-
ing whether a board of directors has fulfilled its fiduciary duty of care,
courts typically apply the business judgment rule. Under the business
judgment rule, directors' actions generally carry a presumption of regu-
larity. That is, directors are presumed to have acted "on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company. '"6 Thus, the business judgment rule
acts as a judicial presumption that protects a board's actions from chal-
3. See DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, 52-55 (4th ed. 1993 &
Supp. 1995) [hereinafter BLOCK, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE].
4. Id. at 124-25.
5. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d
956 (Del. 1994); In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig. 634 A.2d 319 (Del. 1993); U.S. West, Inc. v.
Time Warner, Civ. A. No. 14555, 1996 WL 307445 (Del. Ch. June 6, 1996).
6. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987). Accord
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360-61 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del.
1994).
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lenge unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the board has not satisfied
the presumptive elements of the rule. To overcome the presumption of
regularity, a plaintiff must show that the board acted with "gross negli-
gence. ' Courts generally find gross negligence only in egregious cases,
either where there is no rational basis for the board's action, the board
acted in bad faith, the board engaged in self-dealing, or the board failed
to obtain and consider information reasonably available before acting.8
In the context of defensive measures implemented in anticipation of
or in response to an unsolicited takeover threat, however, courts gener-
ally follow the law of Delaware, America's preeminent corporate juris-
diction.9 Thus, courts review board action under the "enhanced
scrutiny" standard articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.' The Unocal court adopted this standard
upon observing that, in taking steps to defeat or deter an unsolicited
offer, there exists the "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders."" Under Unocal's enhanced scrutiny standard, when a
board undertakes measures in anticipation of or in response to a possible
takeover attempt, the burden shifts to the board to demonstrate that (1) it
had "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness existed"' 2 and (2) that the defensive measure adopted
was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed." 3 The board receives
the benefit of the business judgment rule only if it satisfies both ele-
ments of the test.
The Unocal court stated that target directors will have satisfied the
first step of their fiduciary obligations under the enhanced scrutiny test
"by showing good faith and reasonable investigation."' 4 The court also
noted that evidence demonstrating good faith and reasonable investiga-
tion is "materially enhanced" by factors such as the presence of a major-
ity of independent directors.' 5 It should be noted that directors may rely
on independent financial advisors and counsel in deliberating takeover
7. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
8. See BLOCK, THE BUSINESS JuDGmENT RULE, supra note 3, at 63-72.
9. Under the Internal Affairs Doctrine, corporate law issues are governed by the law of the
state of incorporation. See generally Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
Delaware is the state of incorporation for many corporations. Consequently, its corporate law is
highly developed. Many states follow or consider Delaware law in formulating, developing and
refining their state corporate law.
10. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
11. Id. at 954.
12. Id. at 955.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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proposals, provided that the directors exercise reasonable care in select-
ing advisors who are competent in the matters for which they are con-
sulted and who are not subject to a disqualifying conflict of interest.' 6
While the Unocal court did not define what constitutes good faith
and reasonable investigation, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the
issue in a subsequent case. In Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan,
Inc.,' 7 the court stated that, in conducting such an investigation, the
board should engage in an analysis which considers
among various proper factors, the adequacy and terms of the offer; its
fairness and feasibility; the proposed or actual financing for the offer,
and the consequences of that financing; questions of illegality; the
impact of both the bid and the potential acquisition on other constitu-
encies, provided that it bears some reasonable relationship to general
shareholder interests; the risk of nonconsummation; the basic stock-
holder interests at stake; the bidder's identity, prior background and
other business venture experiences; and the bidder's business plans
for the corporation and their effects on stockholder interests."8
In satisfying the second step of the Unocal standard-the require-
ment that the defensive measure adopted be "reasonable in relation to
the threat posed"-Unocal requires that the directors balance "the nature
of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise" with the
defensive tactic undertaken.' 9 In that regard, the Unocal court stated
that "a board may reasonably consider the basic stockholder interests at
stake, including those of short term speculators, whose actions may have
fueled the coercive aspect of the offer at the expense of the long term
investor."20 The court found the defensive measure at issue in Unocal, a
discriminatory exchange offer, was reasonably related to the takeover
bid, because
the board's decision to offer what it determined to be the fair value of
the corporation to the 49% of its shareholders, who would otherwise
be forced to accept highly subordinated "junk bonds," is reasonable
and consistent with the directors' duty to ensure that the minority
stockholders receive equal value for their shares. 2
Judicial Application of Unocal. The Unocal enhanced scrutiny test
has become the governing standard followed by most courts in review-
16. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991 & Supp. 1996); Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M.
Hoff, Outside Advisors, Director Disinterestedness, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1995 at 5.
17. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
18. Id. at 1282 n.29; see also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1153 (Del. 1989); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 68 (Del. 1989);
Unocal Corp., v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985).
19. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
20. Id. at 955-56.
21. Id. at 957.
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ing corporate defensive responses to unsolicited takeover bids. Among
other defensive measures implemented by targets in response to a hostile
bid, the enhanced scrutiny standard has been applied to stock repurchase
programs,22 shareholder rights plans,2 3 discriminatory rights plans,2 4
self-tender offers 25 and restructuring plans.26 While Unocal imposes a
higher level of scrutiny than that of the traditional business judgment
rule analysis, courts applying the Unocal standard have remained defer-
ential to business determinations made by directors, particularly where
independent directors participate in the decision-making process. This
judicial deference was demonstrated by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc.27 There, the court con-
sidered, among other things, a number of subjective and intangible ele-
ments in determining whether the Time board of directors satisfied
Unocal's requirements in responding to a hostile tender offer by Para-
mount Communications.
Time involved an attempt by Paramount to acquire Time in a cash
tender offer, interfering with a previously announced proposed friendly
merger between Time and Warner Communications. 28 In response to
the Paramount bid, the Time board recast the proposed Warner merger
into an acquisition for cash by Time of approximately 50% of Warner's
common stock to be followed by a second step stock-for-stock merger.29
In addition to considering the financial inadequacy of Paramount's unso-
licited offer, the court allowed Time, the target, to argue that Para-
mount's offer was inconsistent with Time's long-term business strategy,
involved a significant degree of uncertainty that "skewed a comparative
analysis," was designed to confuse or upset the shareholders' vote on a
proposed merger with Warner, and did not provide the best "strategic
'fit"' with Time's policy and culture.3 °
While the court began its analysis by discounting the differences
between long-term versus short-term strategy, in finding that the Para-
mount bid posed a threat to Time's corporate policy and effectiveness,
the court relied heavily on arguments by Time that its board had devel-
22. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
23. See, e.g., id.
24. See, e.g., In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Litig. [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 98,845 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1995).
25. See, e.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch.
1986).
26. See, e.g., Henley Group, Inc. v. Santa Fe S. Pacific Corp., 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1152 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 11, 1988).
27. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
28. Id. at 1144-47.
29. Id. at 1148.
30. Id. at 1153-54.
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oped long-term business plans that would be compromised by a Time-
Paramount combination.31 The court appeared to be reluctant to chal-
lenge a reasonably-informed, long-term corporate strategy, and deter-
mined that it would not require a board to accept a hostile takeover bid if
the board determined that such an acceptance would compromise those
long-term plans:
The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the
selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals. That
duty may not be delegated to the stockholders .... Directors are not
obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a
short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain
the corporate strategy. 32
In light of Time, then, directors are well-advised to consider not
only the adequacy of a hostile tender offer after it has been made, but
also to adopt the pre-offer business practice of periodically discussing
and considering long-term corporate strategy.
The Delaware Supreme Court again demonstrated the substantial
degree of latitude afforded to directors in implementing defensive meas-
ures to hostile bids in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.33 There,
the court articulated a two-step approach to applying the Unocal test.
First, the court stated that the defensive measure adopted must not be
"coercive or preclusive. ''3 Then, provided that if the defensive measure
falls within a "range of reasonableness," it will be upheld.35
In Unitrin, the Delaware Chancery Court upheld the refusal to
redeem a shareholder rights plan, but preliminarily enjoined a repur-
chase program implemented by Unitrin, the target of a hostile takeover
offer by American General Corporation. 36 The chancery court's ration-
ale for issuing the injunction was that the repurchase program was not
"necessary" to protect Unitrin shareholders from an inadequate offer.37
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the injunction order, holding that
the chancery court's application of Unocal placed too heavy a burden on
the board of directors. 38
The supreme court found that the repurchase program was not coer-
cive, as it did not force a management-sponsored alternative on the Uni-
31. Id. at 1154.
32. Id.
33. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
34. Id. at 1387.
35. Id. at 1388.
36. Id. at 1371.
37. Id. at 1376.
38. Id. at 1390-91.
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trin shareholders. 39 Further, the court found that the program was not
preclusive, as it would only "inhibit" and not "doom" American Gen-
eral's ability to wage a proxy fight to obtain control of Unitrin's board
of directors." Thus, the only remaining issue was whether the defensive
measure fell within a range of reasonably proportional responses to
American General's hostile offer. In remanding the issue of reasonable-
ness to the Court of Chancery, the Supreme Court did not formulate a
test to determine reasonableness, but instead recommended that the
Chancery Court consider various issues:
In considering whether the Repurchase Program was within a range
of reasonableness the Court of Chancery should take into considera-
tion whether: (1) it is a statutorily authorized form of business deci-
sion which a board of directors may routinely make in a non-takeover
context; (2) as a defensive response to American General's offer it
was limited and corresponded in degree or magnitude to the degree or
magnitude of the threat (i.e., assuming the threat was relatively
"mild," was the response relatively "mild"?); (3) with the Repurchase
Program, the Unitrin Board properly recognized that all shareholders
are not alike, and provided immediate liquidity to those shareholders
who wanted it.4
Thus, while the Unitrin court emphasized that boards do not have
"unlimited discretion" to defeat hostile takeover threats "by any draco-
nian means available,"42 it stated that the
choice of the term draconian in Unocal was a recognition that the law
affords boards of directors substantial latitude in defending the perim-
eter of the corporate bastion against perceived threats .... [If] a board
reasonably perceives that a threat is on the horizon, it has broad
authority to respond with a panoply of individual or combined defen-
sive precautions.4 3
Directors' Actions Which Implicate The Sale Of The Corporation.
Directors also have been held to assume special duties when they have
made a decision to sell the corporation, and a change of control is immi-
nent. In that context, under the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,44 the board's fidu-
ciary obligations must be exercised to maximize shareholder value.
Defensive measures and the motivations underlying them are deemed to
be moot in this context because "[the] directors' role [changes] from
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting
39. Id. at 1388.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1389.
42. Id. at 1383 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
43. Id. at 1388 n.38.
44. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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the best price for the stockholders."45 The Revlon duty thus requires the
board of directors to create a level playing field in which all bidders are
treated equally so that shareholders will be able to obtain the highest
possible price under the circumstances for their shares.46
Revlon does not, however, preclude disinterested directors from
exercising business judgment in determining the most appropriate way
to advance the shareholders' interests when a sale of the company is
involved. Instead of conducting a formal auction of the corporation, the
board can agree to structure a merger agreement such that other potential
bidders become aware of the proposed transaction and are not precluded
from proposing a transaction superior to that approved by the board. In
In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litigation,47 for example, a
merger agreement between the corporation and a management leveraged
buyout group prohibited a special committee of outside directors from
soliciting potential acquirors, but permitted the committee to "negotiate
with, and provide information to, any potential acquirer who contacted
the Company" for thirty business days (the equivalent of forty-three cal-
endar days).48 The merger agreement further provided that if a compet-
ing bidder outbid the management group, the management group would
be entitled to a termination fee of up to $67.8 million, or approximately
$1 per share. 9 The court upheld this "market check" provision, finding
that the company's press release announcing the merger agreement
"ma[d]e clear.., that the Company ha[d] the right and would entertain
alternative proposals and would cooperate with any such person in the
development of a competing bid."'50
Nevertheless, Revlon duties are triggered only under limited cir-
cumstances. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc,5" the Del-
aware Supreme Court stated that a board of directors assumes the
obligation to conduct a Revlon auction (1) "when a corporation initiates
an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business
reorganization involving a clear breakup of the company" 52 and (2)
when a corporation "abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alter-
native transaction involving the breakup of the company. 53 In Time,
the court found that the proposed stock-for-stock merger between Time
45. Id. at 182.
46. Id. at 184.
47. 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 699 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988).
48. Id. at 712.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 713.
51. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
52. Id. at 1150.
53. Id.
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and Warner Communications did not make a "'sale' of Time 'inevita-
ble. ' ' 54 Further, the court found that the proposed merger did not
invoke Revlon duties "simply because" the agreement "might be con-
strued as putting a corporation either 'in play' or 'up for sale'."5 The
court then found that Time's subsequent recasting of its merger agree-
ment with Warner from a share exchange to a share purchase agreement
did not provide "a basis to conclude that Time had either abandoned its
strategic plan or made a sale of Time inevitable. 56 Thus, finding that
the Time board's reaction to Paramount's hostile tender offer did not
constitute "an abandonment of the corporation's continued existence,"5
the court stated that the defensive response was subject only to a Unocal
analysis. 58
The Delaware Supreme Court clarified its holding in Time in Para-
mount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.59 QVC arose out of a
decision by Paramount Communications Inc.'s board of directors to
enter into a merger agreement with Viacom Inc., pursuant to which
Viacom would acquire Paramount through a tender offer followed by a
second-step merger. The merger agreement also contained a "no-shop"
provision, a termination fee and a stock option agreement, which,
according to the court, were "designed to make it more difficult for a
potential competing bid to succeed."6
After Paramount and Viacom announced their proposed merger,
QVC made a tender offer to acquire Paramount-which offer exceeded
the value to be received by Paramount shareholders in the Paramount-
Viacom transaction-and filed suit for injunctive relief.6' Paramount
and Viacom then negotiated an amended merger agreement that offered
greater value to Paramount shareholders than the original merger agree-
ment, but did not modify the "no-shop" provision, the termination fee,
or the stock option agreement.62 QVC responded by increasing its
offer.63
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected Paramount's arguments that
the Paramount board's actions should be governed only under the Uno-
cal standard, as the court had held in Time.64 Rather, the court found
54. Id. 1151.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1150.
58. Id. at 1151.
59. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
60. Id. at 38-39.
61. Id. at 40.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 41.
64. Id. at 42.
19971
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
that Revlon duties were triggered when the Paramount board entered into
the merger agreement with Viacom. 65 The court distinguished its deci-
sion in Time, noting that, in that case, no change of control in the pro-
posed stock-for-stock merger between Time and Warner took place
because Time was to be "owned by a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated
stockholders both before and after the merger. "66 Thus, according to the
court, the Time-Warner merger did not itself impede Time's sharehold-
ers from benefitting from an acquisition of their shares at a premium at
some point in the future.67 In QVC, on the other hand, the Paramount-
Viacom transaction would have resulted in a change of control from
public shareholders to Viacom's single controlling shareholder-Sum-
ner Redstone-who had the ability to preclude Paramount's other share-
holders from ever receiving a premium for their shares. The court
determined that the "no-shop" provision, the stock option agreement and
the termination fee in the Paramount-Viacom transaction were not "rea-
sonable and in the best interests of the Paramount shareholders"
68
because "[when] a majority of a corporation's voting shares are acquired
by a single person or entity, or by a cohesive group acting together, there
is a significant diminution in the voting power of those who thereby
become minority stockholders. '69 The court found that the defensive
measures designed to deter a competing bid-the "no-shop" provision,
the termination fee, and the stock option agreement-inhibited the Para-
mount board's ability to negotiate with other potential bidders to obtain
the highest possible value for Paramount's stock.7" Accordingly, the
court held that the board had not complied with its obligations under
Revlon.7 1
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc. 72 provides another exam-
ple of board conduct which was held to violate Revlon duties. In Mac-
Millan, management directors took an active role in securing a favorable
bidding position via a lock-up option for one bidder, KKR, over a disfa-
vored bidder, Maxwell, in connection with the sale of MacMillan. In
enjoining the option, the court placed substantial weight on the fact that
the inside directors (who would own twenty percent of the surviving
company under the KKR proposal), and not the independent directors,
controlled the bidding process. 73 The MacMillan court reiterated the
65. Id.
66. Id. at 46.
67. Id. at 47.
68. Id. at 48.
69. Id. at 42.
70. Id. at 48-49.
71. Id. at 51.
72. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
73. Id. at 1279-80.
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principles articulated in Revlon, stating that the lock-up agreement "must
confer a substantial benefit upon the stockholders."74 The purpose of
such an agreement must be to secure a final offer that "materially
[enhances] general stockholder interests. '75 The court found that the
MacMillan directors violated their duties under Revlon, stating that the
auction was "clandestinely and impermissibly skewed in favor of
KKR ' 76 and that there was no "board planning and oversight to insulate
the self-interested management from improper access to the bidding pro-
cess." 77 The court went on to state that when "the intended effect [of a
lock-up agreement] is to end an active auction, at the very least the
independent members of the board must attempt to negotiate alternative
bids before granting such a significant concession. '"78
In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,79 on the other
hand, provides an example of board conduct that satisfies Revlon duties
in the change of control context. In RJR, an RJR management group
informed the RJR board that it was interested in conducting a leveraged
buyout of the corporation.80 After RJR's board issued a press release
announcing the proposed buyout, a rival bidder, KKR, announced its
intention to make a tender offer for RJR as part of a proposed two-step
merger.8' A special committee of RJR's independent directors then con-
ducted an auction, from which the committee received three bids. 82
After the special committee determined that the KKR bid and the man-
agement group's bid were the two most viable of the three bids, the
committee weighed the relative benefits of each, and determined that the
two bids were "substantially equivalent" from a financial perspective
and fair to the RJR shareholders. 3 The special committee recom-
mended that the RJR board accept the KKR bid, however, because,
among other factors: KKR was offering a greater equity interest than
the management group; KKR would retain RJR's tobacco business and a
substantial part of RJR's food businesses, while the management group
would retain only the tobacco business; issues arose under RJR's debt
indentures in connection with the management group proposal but not in
74. Id. at 1284.
75. Id. at 1286.
76. Id. at 1281.
77. Id. at 1282.
78. Id. at 1286.
79. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989),
appeal refused, 556 A.2d 1070 (unpublished opinion, text available at 1989 Del. LEXIS 42 and
1989 WL 16907) (Del. Feb. 2, 1989).
80. See id. at 91,703.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 91,703-04.
83. Id. at 91,708.
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connection with the KKR proposal; KKR-but not the management
group-was willing to provide for the preservation of benefits for
employees who would be terminated due to business divestitures; and
further negotiations, the committee believed, could result in either party
withdrawing from the bidding process. 84 The RJR board followed the
committee's recommendation and accepted the KKR bid.85
In upholding the committee's determination to accept one of two
substantially equivalent offers, the court found that the committee had
satisfied its Revlon duty to achieve the best possible value for sharehold-
ers. 6 The court acknowledged that the committee could have obtained
more information by conducting another round of bidding, but stated
that seeking the additional information could have resulted in one of the
parties walking away.87 The RJR court concluded that a determination
of the proper amount of information a board must have before accepting
a bid is a business decision entitled to the protection of the business
judgment rule: "[T]he amount of information that it is prudent to have
before a decision is made is itself a business judgment of the very type
that courts are institutionally poorly equipped to make."88
Revlon and its progeny demonstrate that, in the sale of control con-
text, directors retain discretion under the business judgment rule to
undertake a sale of the corporation in a manner in which they determine
will best serve shareholder interests. Moreover, directors have discre-
tion to make an objective and informed decision that the highest bid
received does not necessarily translate into the best transaction for the
shareholders. 89 It is essential, however, that when inside directors have
a significant interest in the outcome of an auction, the independent direc-
tors should control the bidding process and conduct the negotiations so
that bidders can compete for control of the company on a level playing
field.
III. TYPES OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES AVAILABLE TO DIRECTORS
While Unocal and Revlon subject boards of directors to a higher
standard of review in the takeover context, those decisions do not dis-
able a board of directors' ability to implement defensive measures. The
following are examples of defensive measures that (1) a board of direc-
tors may adopt or propose in the absence of an actual takeover situation
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 91,714.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See BLOCK, TuE BUSINESS JUDGEMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 266-87.
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so as to provide the board the flexibility to respond to an actual hostile
threat or (2) can be implemented in response to a hostile bid after it has
been made.
Structural Defenses. In carrying out its fiduciary duties, the board
of directors must act to promote and protect the shareholders' best inter-
ests. This duty requires that the board consider and balance sharehold-
ers' immediate value and return on investment with long-term value and
return on investment. Because directors have access to information that
may be unavailable to shareholders, the board may properly enact meas-
ures intended to prevent shareholder vulnerability to inadequate or coer-
cive hostile bids by ensuring that the target board of directors is a
necessary participant in the takeover situation.
For example, the board can adopt by-law provisions or the share-
holders can approve charter provisions intended to deter unfair or coer-
cive hostile takeover tactics. Courts are particularly deferential to
defensive amendments to the corporate charter or by-laws where share-
holder approval -is obtained.9° Charter amendments introduced for
shareholder vote after a takeover proposal has surfaced, however, may
be more difficult to adopt than similar amendments proposed in the
absence of a specific takeover proposal. The following illustrate defen-
sive charter and by-law provisions that serve as structural defenses to
hostile takeover attempts:
(1) Longer board terms and staggered board elections, in which only a
portion of the directors are elected each year, make hostile bids more
difficult. The theory behind implementing longer board terms as a
defensive strategy is that even a raider acquiring all or a majority of the
target's shares will not immediately gain control of the corporation
because the existing board members must first serve their terms. In that
regard, staggered board elections make a proxy fight in aid of a tender
offer difficult because only a minority of the target's directors will be
elected in any given year. Consequently, two or more annual meetings
are necessary to gain control of the board.
(2) Provisions limiting removal of directors "for cause only" also thwart
hostile takeover attempts by making it more difficult for a raider to
remove the target's incumbent board.
(3) Cumulative voting rights encourage minority representation on the
board of directors by permitting shareholders to apportion their individ-
ual votes in any fashion they choose when electing directors. Eliminat-
ing cumulative voting rights deters hostile takeover attempts by making
90. See, e.g., Henley Group, Inc. v. Santa Fe S. Pacific Corp., 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1152 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 11, 1988); Torchmark Corp. v. Bixby, 708 F. Supp. 1070 (W.D. Mo. 1988); Siegman v.
Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 218 (Del. Ch. May 5, 1989).
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it more difficult for raiders to gain seats on the target corporation's
board. Most states do not require but permit cumulative voting, and
generally require a corporate charter or by-law provision to grant cumu-
lative voting rights.
(4) By-law provisions requiring shareholders to give advance notice of
intent to elect directors or to submit proposals at a shareholder meeting
protect against unexpected hostile bids or attempts to gain control of the
target's board. While no court has ruled on the length of time that con-
stitutes an unreasonable advance notice requirement, such requirements
should be "reasonable to allow time to set and publicize a record date for
the meeting, to prepare proxy materials, and to allow shareholders to
gain information to make an informed judgment before the meeting."'"
Courts afford liberal discretion to directors in adopting advance notice
requirement by-laws. Generally, directors must only ensure that a share-
holder vote is held "within a finite and relatively short period,"92 and
should not manipulate the corporate machinery to deprive shareholders
of their franchise.93 For example, in Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., a
nine percent shareholder sought to expand the board from seven to fif-
teen members and to elect eight directors to fill the newly created vacan-
cies in order to implement a recapitalization that would include large
dividends for shareholders. 94 The board responded by adopting a by-law
amendment enlarging the board's size to nine and appointing two new
directors, thereby ensuring that the nine percent shareholder would not
gain control of the board.95 The court set aside the board's expansion as
"an unintended breach of the duty of loyalty. ' 96 While the court
declined to adopt a "per se rule invalidating, in equity, every board
action taken for the sole or primary purpose of thwarting a shareholder
vote, 97 it concluded that the board in Blasius could not meet "the heavy
burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for such action." 98
The court emphasized that "Delaware courts have long exercised a most
sensitive and protective regard for the free and effective exercise of vot-
ing rights." 99
91. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 727 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Me. 1989); see
also R.D. Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enter., Inc., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 (Del. Ch. Jan.
14, 1991).
92. Georgia-Pacific, 727 F. Supp. at 34.
93. See, e.g., Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988); Schnell v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
94. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 654.
95. See id. at 655-56.
96. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663.
97. Id. at 662.
98. Id. at 661.
99. Id. at 659 n.2.
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(5) Charter or by-law provisions that limit shareholders' ability to call a
special meeting provide additional protection against a hostile bid. For
example, charter provisions can limit the ability to call special meetings
to directors. Alternatively, by-law provisions can limit the subject mat-
ter for which shareholders may call special meetings and can require
shareholders to provide advance notice of intent to call such a meeting.
In addition, charter provisions can be adopted to require a supermajority
of shareholders to call a special meeting. Similarly, charter provisions
disallowing a shareholder vote via written consent in lieu of holding a
meeting serve to prevent bidders from taking immediate action affecting
corporate control and pressuring a board into taking precipitous action.
(6) Fair price charter provisions can require a bidder to pay all share-
holders the highest cash price it paid for any shares it acquired at any
time in a two-tier front-end loaded merger. Fair price provisions prevent
discriminatory pricing in the second step of a merger that tends to pres-
sure the target's shareholders into selling their shares in the first step.
These provisions generally do not apply if a supermajority of the target's
shareholders or the board approves the merger or the stock acquisition.
(7) Charter provisions that require more than a simple majority for
shareholder approval of any merger or acquisition or to amend protec-
tive charter or by-law provisions also serve as a defensive mechanism.
Such provisions are usually accompanied by a provision requiring a
supermajority vote to amend the supermajority provision. A variation of
the supermajority provision is one requiring a majority of the minority
shareholders to approve a merger. Under this variation, if the bidder
holds more than fifty percent of the outstanding shares in a target, a
majority of the remaining shareholders must approve any business
consolidation.
Shareholder Rights Plans. One of the most common defensive
measures that the board of directors can adopt without a shareholder
vote is the shareholder rights plan, colloquially referred to as the "poison
pill." While boards typically adopt shareholder rights plans before a
tender offer, they also can be implemented after a bid has surfaced.
Shareholder rights plans are designed to make a target less attractive to
corporate raiders by giving the target's other shareholders the right to
purchase the target's stock cheaply prior to the acquisition or merger, or
in the final acquired or merged company after a successful hostile take-
over. Should a hostile bid surface, rights plans provide the target's
board with additional time to deliberate on the course of action that will
best promote the shareholders' interest by providing a period of time
during which a hostile bidder will be unwilling to complete a hostile
takeover and trigger the rights plan.
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Shareholder rights plans involve the issuance of rights or warrants
to shareholders that entitle the holder (other than the owner of a speci-
fied percentage of the target's voting stock) to purchase shares of the
target corporation's common or preferred stock at either a designated
exercise price or a price set by formula. Whether designated or set by
formula, the exercise price is usually significantly higher than the tar-
get's current market price because it is intended to reflect the anticipated
long-term value of the stock during the term of the warrant (typically ten
years). Because the exercise price is "out of the money," the warrants
are not expected to be exercised. The actual "poison" in the "poison
pill," however, is typically found in so-called "flip over" and "flip in"
provisions of shareholder rights plans.'
Flip over provisions give shareholders the right to buy shares of the
entity acquiring the target corporation at a designated price, often half of
the bidder's current market price, if the bidder obtains control of the
target and completes a merger. The surviving corporation is obligated to
honor the rights and sell its shares at the designated cheap price. The
intended and almost inevitable effect of such a plan is to dilute the
acquirer's equity to a "devastating" level.' 0 ' Flip in provisions allow
shareholders other than the acquiror to exercise a right to buy target
stock cheaply when a bidder acquires a designated percentage (usually
an amount between ten and twenty percent) of the target's outstanding
stock. Flip in provisions are also triggered when an acquirer engages in
a merger in which the target corporation is the surviving corporation or
engages in self-dealing transactions, such as obtaining loans from the
target at below-market interest rates. As with flip over provisions, flip
in provisions operate on the theory that a bidder will be reluctant to
trigger the rights plan due to the consequent dilution of its equity if the
rights plan takes effect. In practice, a flip in provision is virtually
always accompanied by a flip over provision.
Because a bidder will not want to risk triggering the rights, it gener-
ally will not exceed the flip in trigger or complete an attempted takeover
unless the target's board of directors first redeems or amends the rights
plan to permit the bidder's acquisition. Thus, because the bidder is
forced to negotiate any such redemption or amendment with the target's
board, the target board's bargaining power in connection with the pro-
posed acquisition increases substantially. This increased bargaining
power often results in higher takeover premiums for the target's share-
holders where the target is ultimately sold.
Less common shareholder rights plans include put plans, back-end
100. See BLOCK, TuE BUSINESS JuoDrErr RULE, supra note 3, at 519-24.
101. See generally Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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or debt provision plans, and disproportionate voting provision plans.
Put plans give the target's shareholders the right to sell their shares back
to the target at a designated price or at a price set by formula if a bidder
buys a majority, but not all, of the target's shares. These plans give
shareholders the option of selling back to the target, thereby preventing
the second step in a two-tier front-loaded offer from occurring. The
back-end provision plan grants shareholders the right to redeem their
shares for cash or debt securities either at a price determined by formula
or at the highest price at which the hostile bidder acquired its shares
once a hostile bidder obtains a triggering percentage of the corporation's
outstanding stock. The redemption price generally is significantly
higher than the current market value of the stock. Back-end provisions
serve as a defensive mechanism by establishing a minimum takeover
price. Disproportionate voting provisions are calculated to give large
shareholders inferior voting rights. Under these provisions, the target
issues a preferred class of stock that grants multiple voting rights to
current shareholders. Any shareholder acquiring shares after the date
the preferred stock is issued does not obtain the superior voting rights
and thereby has diminished voting status.
Two issues arise when a target adopts a shareholder rights plan as a
defensive measure to hostile takeover attempts. The first issue is the
propriety of adopting a shareholder rights plan. The second issue is the
propriety of refusing to redeem an intact rights plan after a hostile bid
has been made. 102 As to the first issue, since the Delaware Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Moran v. Household International, Inc.,"°3
it has been well-settled that boards may adopt shareholder rights plans.
In Household, the court applied Unocal's two-pronged test and found
that Household's board exercised proper business judgment in adopting
a shareholder rights plan to deter future hostile takeover attempts which
the board believed could be unfair or coercive to Household
shareholders.
The rights plan at issue in Household was a flip over plan that was
triggered if a person acquired twenty percent or made a tender offer for
at least thirty percent of the company.' °4 If a merger occurred under
these circumstances, each Household shareholder could exercise its right
under the plan to purchase $200 worth of the acquirer's common stock
for the $100 exercise price of the right. 0 Applying Unocal, the court
upheld the rights plan, first finding that the board had reasonable
102. See BLOCK, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 523-24.
103. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
104. Id. at 1348.
105. See id. at 1349.
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grounds to believe that the plan would protect Household from "coercive
two-tier offers" that posed a threat to "corporate policy and effective-
ness." '0 6 Second, the court found that the directors' concern over the
"increasing frequency in the financial services industry of 'boot-strap'
and 'bust-up' takeovers" demonstrated that the defensive mechanism
was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."'1 7 Household demon-
strates that shareholder rights plans are permissible in the abstract.
Boards of directors thus have the flexibility to implement rights plans
designed to protect shareholders against unfair, coercive and inadequate
tender offers.
The second issue, and the subject of most litigation regarding
shareholder rights plans, concerns the board's obligation to redeem an
intact rights plan after a hostile bid has been made. This issue typically
arises in one of three circumstances.
In one scenario, the target board can refuse to redeem an intact
shareholder rights plan and offer its shareholders an economic alterna-
tive to tendering through mechanisms such as a restructuring or recapi-
talization. The economic alternative is intended to allow the target to
remain independent while offering shareholders a number of benefits.
Shareholders receive not only a short-term gain via dividends, share
repurchases or other distribution of corporate assets, but also a continued
equity interest in the target's long-term viability. Unocal's two-step
analysis, which applies to defensive measures generally, is also applica-
ble in determining whether the board in this situation has fulfilled its
fiduciary duties in refusing to redeem a shareholder rights plan in the
face of an unsolicited takeover bid.
The Unocal standard was applied to a shareholder rights plan in
Gelco Corp. V. Coniston Partners.' In Gelco, the court refused to
require Gelco, the target, to redeem a shareholder rights plan in the face
of a hostile tender offer of twenty-six dollars per share when Gelco was
providing an exchange offer restructuring plan in which shareholders
would receive a cash and securities package worth twenty-four dollars
per share.' 0 9 There, the court stated that Gelco's decision not to redeem
its rights plan was "clearly a reasonable response to [a] hostile bid,
which the Board, partially based on advice from its investment banker,
concluded was inadequate from a financial point of view,"" 0 and that
the board was reasonably concerned about the bidder's "reputation as a
106. Id. at 1356.
107. Id. at 1357.
108. 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986), affid in part and vacated in part on other grounds,
811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987).
109. Id. at 837.
110. Id. at 849.
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raider, uninterested in continued operation of the Company."'II
In Grand Metropolitan Public Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 12 on the
other hand, the court ordered the target, Pillsbury, to redeem a share-
holder rights plan. There, the court found that the restructuring plan
Pillsbury offered to its shareholders as an alternative to tendering was
not adequate in light of the length of time it would take for shareholders
to realize the benefits of the restructuring plan.' 13 The Pillsbury restruc-
turing plan would not offer economic benefit to the shareholders for a
four to five year period." 4 Furthermore, Pillsbury's financial advisors
did not consider the hostile bid inadequate. 1 5 The court stated that any
benefits that could be realized from the restructuring were "subject to
economic and competitive conditions which are beyond Pillsbury's con-
trol," and that $63, the amount of the hostile bid, which the court did not
find inadequate, was "preferable to the possibility of $68 [the purported
value of the restructuring plan] if all of the 'ifs' in Pillsbury's plan dis-
appear and its hopes for the future become realities."' " 6
In a second scenario, the target board can refuse to redeem an intact
rights plan and negotiate a sale of the company to a favored bidder, also
known as a "white knight." In this situation, Revlon duties are typically
implicated. However, provided the target board acts for the purpose of
enhancing the bidding process and obtaining the best price for the share-
holders, the target may not be required to redeem its rights plan. Thus,
in CRTF Corp. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.,' 17 the target, Fed-
erated, redeemed a shareholder rights plan in connection with an offer
by Macy's, but refused to redeem the rights plan in connection with an
offer by CRTF.1 8 The court denied CRTF's request for a preliminary
injunction against use of the rights plan in connection with its offer stat-
ing, "[a] Board clearly has the right to use its powers to defeat a coercive
... bid... where the Board believes the offer would not be in the best
interests of the shareholders.""' 9 The court based its decision on its
finding that "nothing at this point suggests that the Federated Board is
acting with any other motive than to enhance the bidding and to raise the
price for the benefit of the shareholders."' 120
I1ll Id. at 850.
112. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
113. Id. at 1057-58.
114. See id. at 1057.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
118. Id. at 433.
119. Id. at 440.
120. Id. at 441.
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In contrast, in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 21 the court
enjoined Macmillan's use of a shareholder rights plan as a defensive
measure against a hostile offer by Maxwell when Macmillan granted a
lock-up asset option at the end of the auction to another bidding group
that included members of Macmillan's management. The losing bidder,
Maxwell Communications Corp., then increased its bid, exceeding the
winning bid by twenty cents per share, in a tender offer conditioned on
the invalidation of the lock-up option. While the court found that the
lock-up option was not responsible for Macmillan "not receiving [the
losing bidder's] highest bid before the auction gavel fell,"'122 the court
nonetheless enjoined the operation of Macmillan's rights plan as an
improper defensive measure against Maxwell's increased tender offer. 23
The court found that no corporate purpose would be served by leaving
the rights plan in place "because the auction is over and the two highest
bids are now on the table.' ' 24 "Stated differently," the court reasoned,
"the fact that the auction has concluded should not deprive the share-
holders of the opportunity to consider an alternative cash transaction for
a fair (indeed higher) price."' 125
In yet a third scenario, the target board may refuse to redeem an
intact rights plan without offering its shareholders an economic alterna-
tive to tendering. Although there is little experience with this strategy-
referred to as the "Just Say No" defense-a recent judicial pronounce-
ment on the issue of a board's obligation to redeem a shareholder rights
plan is found in Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc.126
There, the court affirmed the target's ability to "just say no" to a hostile
takeover attempt in some circumstances.
In Wallace, Wallace Computer Services, the target, refused to
entertain Moore Corp.'s offer, despite the fact that greater than 73% of
Wallace's shareholders had tendered into the offer and despite the fact
that the Wallace board offered its shareholders no economic alternative
to tendering. 2 7 The court found that the board's refusal to redeem the
shareholder rights plan satisfied the Unocal test.
First, the court found that the Wallace Board was reasonable in
concluding that Moore's offer was inadequate, thereby posing a threat to
121. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,071 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 1988),
rev'd on other grounds, 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
122. Id. at 91,024.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
127. Id. at 1553.
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corporate policy and effectiveness. 2 ' The court noted that an inade-
quate, non-coercive tender offer can constitute a threat under Unocal not
only when the target needs additional time to organize a suitable alterna-
tive to the tender offer, but significantly, also when shareholders might
tender their shares without completely understanding the economic
value of the target's business strategy.1 29 The court found that Moore's
inadequate offer was a legally cognizable threat for the latter reason:
"Moore's tender offer poses a threat that shareholders might tender their
shares without appreciating the fact that after substantial capital invest-
ment, Wallace is actually witnessing the beginning of the pay-off of its
business strategy."1 30 The Wallace court, following Time and Unitrin,
then concluded that the Wallace board reasonably investigated the ade-
quacy of Moore's tender offer. The court noted that the Wallace board
met three times within a two week period to discuss the offer, hired an
investment banker to review the financial aspects of the offer and con-
sidered Wallace's present and future long-term plans-and strategies.' 3'
Significantly, the court relied on evidence that Wallace was succeeding
financially, implying that a target's financial success lends credibility to
the future viability of its long-term business strategy, thereby enhancing
any demonstration of reasonable investigation. The court stated, "the
Wallace Board could reasonably conclude, based on the upward trend in
earnings per share, that the company was well-positioned to reap eco-
nomic benefits in the future, which would support their initial reaction
that the Moore offer seemed 'low ball. ' "1 32
Second, the court held that the Wallace board's refusal to redeem
the shareholder rights plan was "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed" because it was neither preclusive nor coercive since it (i) did not
absolutely prevent shareholders from realizing a control premium for
their stock and (ii) did not deny shareholders the right to elect directors
in a proxy contest. 133
Wallace underscores the necessity for a board of directors to con-
sider a hostile takeover bid and a refusal to redeem a shareholder rights
plan in light of the corporation's long-term business strategies. Wallace
further indicates that if a target demonstrates a likelihood of succeeding
financially, courts are more likely to presume that the board's long-term
business strategy is in the shareholders' best interests. In these circum-
stances, courts will likely uphold a refusal to redeem a shareholder rights
128. Id. at 1558-60.
129. See id. at 1560-61.
130. Id. at 1560.
131. Id. at 1558.
132. Id. at 1559.
133. Id. at 1563.
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plan, notwithstanding shareholders' positive response to an unsolicited
bid, and notwithstanding the target's failure to offer an economic alter-
native to the hostile offer.
It should be noted that a hostile bidder may attempt to circumvent a
shareholder rights plan by conducting a proxy contest at a special meet-
ing or annual meeting to replace the target board with directors who will
redeem the rights plan. Staggered terms for directors and prohibitions
on shareholder action by written consent or through special meetings,
however, can forestall such a strategy. Additionally, "continuing direc-
tor" provisions in rights plans can frustrate a hostile bidder's attempt to
displace a shareholder rights plan by unseating the incumbent board.
Such provisions, sometimes referred to as "Dead Head" provisions, gen-
erally limit the power to redeem a shareholder rights plan to "continuing
directors," i.e., those directors who were seated at the time the rights
plan was adopted or their elected replacements. Alternatively, "continu-
ing directors" may be defined as directors unaffiliated with and seated
before the hostile bidder acquired its shares, or directors nominated to
replace continuing directors by a majority of the seated continuing
directors.
In Bank of New York Co., Inc. v. Irving Bank Corp.,3 4 the court,
applying New York law, enjoined a continuing director provision that
permitted redemption of a shareholder rights plan only if (1) continuing
directors constituted a majority of the board or (2) any non-continuing
directors were seated in direct succession to continuing directors and
either were elected by a two-thirds shareholder vote, or no other signifi-
cant corporate transaction was related to their election. 35 The court in
Irving Bank invalidated the continuing director provision on the grounds
that it constituted an unauthorized restriction on the powers of certain
types of duly elected directors. 136
Issuance of Stock into Friendly Hands. Another defensive measure
that a corporation may employ in an effort to protect itself against a
hostile takeover attempt involves placing a substantial amount of stock
in the hands of persons or entities presumed "friendly" to the incumbent
board, such as a "white squire" or an Employee Stock Option Plan
("ESOP"). 137
In "white squire" transactions, the target sells a substantial block of
134. 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
135. Id. at 483.
136. Id. at 485-86.
137. See generally Dennis J. Block, et al., Hostile Acquisitions and Defensive Strategies:
Recent Developments, in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1996: THE NEW ENVIRONMENT at
15 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7125, 1996) [hereinafter Block,
Hostile Acquisitions].
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stock (often less than twenty percent of the outstanding stock so as to
avoid a New York Stock Exchange rule requiring shareholder approval
of the issuance of stock in excess of twenty percent) to an investor per-
ceived as friendly to the incumbent board. White squire sales are partic-
ularly effective in states which have enacted business combination
statutes. Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, for
example, prohibits "business combination[s]" between the company and
an "interested shareholder."' 38 An "interested shareholder" is defined as
a shareholder owning fifteen percent or more of the company's stock for
a period of three years after the shareholder obtains his stock.139 Inter-
ested stockholders are exempted from the restrictions of section 203,
however, if (1) the board approved the business combination before the
interested shareholder acquired that status, (2) the shareholder obtained
eighty-five percent of the company's stock in the same transaction in
which he obtained over fifteen percent of the outstanding stock (shares
owned by management are excluded from the calculation) or (3) the
board plus 66-2/3 of the shares not held by the fifteen percent or more
shareholder approved the business combination after the interested
shareholder acquired his stock. 4° Thus, if the target's management sells
at least sixteen percent of its stock to a white squire, thereby preventing
a would-be raider from obtaining eighty-five percent of the shares, it
may be able to prevent the raider from accomplishing a back-end
merger.
White squire sales motivated solely for entrenchment purposes are
invalid under Unocal. If, however, the stock sale is a reasonable and
proportionate response to a hostile takeover bid that could threaten
shareholder value, it will be protected by the business judgment rule. In
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc.,'4 ' a California
federal court upheld a plan creating a new class of common stock that
was immediately issued to a white squire. There, in response to a tender
offer by the Limited for over half of the outstanding shares of Carter
Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., Carter Hawley Hale sold convertible preferred
stock possessing a vote equivalent to twenty-two percent of its outstand-
ing voting shares to General Cinema.'42 General Cinema, in turn,
agreed to vote the shares as recommended by the Carter Hawley Hale
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (1991); see also N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 912 (McKinney
1986 & Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-1110-1133 (1994 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 13.1-725-728 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995).
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(5) (1991).
140. See section 203(a).
141. No. 84-2200-AWT (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 1984).
142. See id.
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board.1 13 The court upheld the sale to General Cinema, stating that,
"this was a prudent exercise of business judgment .... Once the Board
determines that it believes the unfriendly offer is not adequate for its
shareholders, ... it has the obligation to take such actions as it feels is
necessary to protect the rights of the shareholders." 144
Employee Stock Ownership Plans. A target can also protect itself
from a hostile takeover attempt by issuing common stock to an
employee stock ownership plan ("ESOP").' 45 ESOPs are governed by
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended
("ERISA").146 As a defensive mechanism, ESOPs operate on the
assumption that ESOP shares are likely to be voted or tendered in
accordance with management's interests. Under ERISA, the board of
directors of the corporate sponsor appoints a trustee of the ESOP. 147
The trustee could be an officer or director of the target corporation or a
corporate trustee. Under ERISA, the trustee has a fiduciary duty to act
in the best interests of ESOP participants. 148 Where shares of the target
corporation are purchased with a loan (either from the target corporation
or from a financial institution guaranteed by the target corporation), a
leveraged ESOP holds shares allocated to participant accounts, and unal-
located shares are held in a suspense account pending amortization of
the ESOP loan. Generally, all voting decisions and decisions whether to
tender with respect to allocated shares are passed through to plan partici-
pants as "named fiduciaries" under ERISA. 149 The ESOP document
directs the trustee to follow the directions or non-directions of the par-
ticipants. Many ESOPs also pass through voting and tendering deci-
sions with respect to unallocated shares by providing that the voting or
tendering of unallocated shares is to be directed by the participants, as
named fiduciaries, in proportion to their directions on allocated shares.
The Department of Labor has taken the position in Reich v.
NationsBank of Georgia, a litigation against NationsBank S° arising
from a self-tender offer, that a trustee has a fiduciary duty (1) to override
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. ESOPs present a number of complex tax and ERISA issues in addition to implications in
contests for corporate control. See Susan P. Serota, New Techniques, Special Features and
Enhanced Incentives in Utilizing ESOPs, in TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS,
DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS, AND
RESTRUCTURINGS 1996, at 959, 1022 (PLI Tax & Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No.
14-3684).
146. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
147. See section 1103(a).
148. See section 1109.
149. See section 1103(a)(1).
150. See Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1345, (N.D. Ga. Mar. 29 1995), available in 1995
Westlaw 316550.
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the directions of participants with respect to unallocated shares if the
trustee would not have reached the same result' 5' and (2) to affirma-
tively make a decision with respect to allocated shares with respect to
which no direction was received.'52 In NationsBank, the Department did
not contest the failure of the trustee to override the directions of partici-
pants with respect to directions received on allocated shares, notwith-
standing that the statutory provisions of ERISA with respect to
directions by named fiduciaries make no distinction between allocated
and unallocated shares. 153
In a decision of first impression, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with the Department of
Labor in finding that participants have an inherent conflict of interest in
acting as named fiduciaries of unallocated shares. 54 The court's analy-
sis was very conclusory in assuming, as a given fact, that current partici-
pants could not act in the best interests of future participants (including
themselves) as the ultimate beneficiaries of the unallocated shares. 55
The court also agreed with the Department of Labor that the trustee
could not rely on a "non-direction" with respect to allocated shares.' 56
The decision is being appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the Department of Labor, in a
letter (the "Lanoff" letter), modified its position with respect to unallo-
cated shares and non-directions regarding allocated shares.' 57 In the
Lanoff letter, the Department stated that a trustee of a collectively bar-
gained plan must follow plan provisions with respect to directions or
non-directions (whether of allocated or unallocated shares) unless the
trustee could affirmatively determine that to do so would constitute a
breach of ERISA. The letter states that a trustee cannot ignore such
directions merely because the trustee would have reached a different
result. Rather, the trustee has the burden of demonstrating that follow-
ing such provisions would result in a violation of ERISA. It is unclear
what effect this letter will have on the pending NationsBank case.
It is generally accepted that when ESOP shares are voted or
directed by employees, the stock is assumed to be held in hands friendly
to the incumbent board. Since hostile takeover attempts tend to raise
151. See id. at *4.
152. See id.
153. See id. at *5.
154. See id. at *6.
155. See id.
156. See id. at *7.
157. See Letter from Olena Berg, Assistant Secretary of Labor, to Ian Lanoff (Sept. 28, 1995)
(on file with author). See also Robert N. Eccles & David E. Gordon, 4 ERISA LITIG. Rep. 1, 4
(1995).
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concerns about job security, employees are generally believed to elect
job security and vote their ESOP shares in accordance with manage-
ment's wishes. This position is not inconsistent with acting to maximize
the future value of a leveraged ESOP to plan participants, as an acquirer
generally would terminate a leveraged ESOP in order to reduce prospec-
tive benefits. Furthermore, an independent trustee necessarily has to
take into consideration lost prospective benefits under an ESOP if a vot-
ing or tendering decision is made by the trustee. Accordingly, by issu-
ing stock to an ESOP, the target's board of directors may enhance its
opportunity to receive the support of a significant percentage of the tar-
get's outstanding shares should a proxy or change of control contest
arise.
An additional factor to consider is the effect of state anti-takeover
statutes. A block of ESOP stock might serve to defeat a hostile bid by
preventing a raider from obtaining sufficient shares to complete a
merger if a state anti-takeover statute prevents "interested shareholders"
from entering into a business combination with the company without
board approval, or without acquiring a very high percentage of the com-
pany's outstanding shares, including ESOP shares. 58 In such a case, if
ESOP plan participants agree with management, the hostile bidder may
not be able to acquire enough shares to effect a takeover. Section 203 of
the General Corporation Law of Delaware demonstrates the effective-
ness of the ESOP as a protective mechanism to hostile takeover
attempts. Stock is not "outstanding" stock, and thus is excluded from
the eighty-five percent calculation needed to approve a business consoli-
dation with an "interested" shareholder, if it is owned by management or
is owned by an employee benefit plan where the employee participants
do not have pass-through tender rights, i.e., "the right to determine con-
fidentially whether shares held subject to the plan will be tendered in a
tender or exchange offer."' 159 Conversely, stock held by an ESOP with
effective pass-through provisions are considered outstanding. Thus, if
an ESOP with effective pass-through provisions holds more than fifteen
percent of all outstanding shares after a tender, a business combination
with the acquirer would be effectively blocked. Consequently, corpora-
tions incorporated in Delaware are motivated to grant pass-through vot-
ing and tendering rights to ESOP plan participants on both allocated and
unallocated shares so that ESOP shares will be included in the eighty-
five percent calculation and so that interested shareholders will be less
likely to secure the shares necessary to complete an unsolicited business
combination.
158. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991).
159. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203(a)(21).
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Importantly, the application of Section 203 to pass-through rights
on unallocated shares in an ESOP has not been the subject of any court
decisions to date. Arguably, a well-designed ESOP with appropriate
pass-through provisions should qualify. The Eleventh Circuit's decision
in the NationsBank case will be closely watched because of its indirect
bearing on this issue. However, because of the recent change in the
Department of Labor's position on pass-through directions in the Lanoff
letter, a single adverse decision should not be considered determinative
until the Delaware Supreme court decides a case under section 203 on
the merits.
Generally, even in the hostile takeover context, ESOPs are afforded
business judgment rule protection provided the target board reasonably
believed the ESOP transaction at issue would serve the corporation's
best interest. If business judgment rule protection is not applicable, the
ESOP transaction must satisfy the fairness test, which governs transac-
tions and decisions not protected by the business judgment rule. In that
regard, ESOPs should be implemented to serve legitimate corporate pur-
poses, such as providing retirement benefits, supplementing employee
compensation, promoting employee morale and loyalty, and improving
employee productivity. 160 ESOPs created "solely as a tool of manage-
ment self-perpetuation" have been invalidated. 16 ' Another indicator of
legitimate corporate purpose is the proximity of the adoption of the
ESOP to the hostile bid. While not dispositive, an ESOP adopted on
short notice shortly after a hostile bid has been made may be suspect and
will be subject to close scrutiny. The extent to which the corporation
benefits from the ESOP transaction (for example, in the form of
increased productivity) also indicates whether the motivation underlying
the transaction was to entrench the board or promote the corporation's
best interest.
For example, in Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp.,62 the
Delaware Chancery Court upheld an ESOP implemented before the
emergence of a hostile tender offer under the "entire fairness standard."
That case involved Polaroid's sale of $300 million of voting preferred
stock to a white squire, Corporate Partners, during the pendency of an
unwanted all-cash for all-shares tender offer for Polaroid by Shamrock
Holdings. Before Shamrock made its tender offer, but after it expressed
an interest in effecting a business combination with Polaroid, the Polar-
160. See, e.g., RCM Sec. Fund, Inc. v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318, 1333 (2d Cir. 1991); Norlin
Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 1984); NCR Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 761 F. Supp. 475, 496 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559
A.2d 257, 272 & n.16 (Del. Ch. 1989).
161. Norlin Corp., 744 F.2d at 266.
162. 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989).
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oid board of directors implemented an ESOP that would hold approxi-
mately fourteen percent of Polaroid's outstanding shares. 163 The court
outlined several important factors to be considered in evaluating the fair-
ness of the Polaroid ESOP transaction. First, the court considered the
source of the funding for the ESOP transaction, and concluded that
ESOPs funded and controlled by employees, rather than the corporation,
are considered "shareholder neutral" and establish a "strong indicia of
fairness."' 16 Second, the court considered whether the ESOP's effect on
the corporation would enhance or impair corporate productivity. 165 Not-
ing that ESOPs generally increase employee productivity, the court said
that any "hidden costs" that might affect productivity must also be con-
sidered. 166 The court found, however, that a possible pay cut did not
constitute a hidden cost, as there was no evidence that it would result in
decreased productivity. 167 Third, the court examined the potential anti-
takeover effect of the ESOP. 168 The court found that, in light of the
applicable Delaware statute provisions, the ESOP "may mean that a
potential acquirer will have to gain the employees' confidence and sup-
port in order to be successful in its takeover effort," but concluded that
there had been "no showing that such support is or would be impossible
to obtain."' 69
Finally, the court considered the dilutive effect of the ESOP trans-
action. Recognizing that the transaction diluted the shares held by pub-
lic stockholders and could result in a reduction in earnings per share, the
court nevertheless decided that "a minimal reduction in earnings per
share is fair where, as here, it is necessary in order to promptly imple-
ment a large ESOP that is intended to increase corporate earnings."' 170
In finding the Polaroid ESOP fair, the court appeared to place the great-
est emphasis on the source of funding for and control over the ESOP.
Even while acknowledging that the motivation underlying the adoption
of the ESOP was, at least in part, to avert a hostile takeover, the court
concluded that the ESOP was "designed to . . . and [is] likely to add
value to the company" and "[did] not prevent the stockholders from
receiving or considering alternatives."' 171
In contrast, in NCR Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph
163. See id. at 267-69.
164. Id. at 271.
165. See id. at 272.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 274.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 276.
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Co.,' 72 the court formulated a two-part test for determining the applica-
bility of business judgment rule protection to ESOP transactions: (1) the
target's board of directors must adopt the ESOP in the belief that it will
serve the corporation's best interests and (2) the directors' belief must be
reasonable. The court concluded that while NCR's board adopted the
ESOP in the good faith belief that it would serve the best interests of the
corporation, that belief was not reasonable because the board was not
adequately informed.1 73 The court declined to enumerate any particular
issues a board must consider in adopting an ESOP, but instead consid-
ered the "totality of the circumstances" under which the NCR board
adopted ESOP.174
The court then analyzed the ESOP under the fairness test. Noting
that the ESOP was "motivated, at least in part, by the legitimate corpo-
rate purpose" of employee compensation, the court went on to state that
the board's overwhelming concern in implementing the ESOP was
entrenchment of NCR' s incumbent management, and not employee ben-
efits. 175 Accordingly, the court declared NCR's ESOP to be unfair,
invalid, and unenforceable. 76
Notwithstanding cases such as NCR, ESOPs adopted in close prox-
imity to a hostile bid are not per se invalid. As the court in RCM Securi-
ties Fund, Inc. v. Stanton stated, an "ESOP may contemplate future
control" of the target. 77 The issue is not whether a hostile bid was a
factor in the decision to adopt the ESOP, but whether the ESOP was
adopted for the primary purpose of benefiting the corporation. Thus,
ESOPs adopted pursuant to a long-term plan, or that were the subject of
discussion before a hostile bid was made, will likely be upheld on the
theory that the motivation underlying the transaction was not the
unwanted takeover attempt, but other legitimate business purposes.' 7 8
In Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., for example, the
court upheld an ESOP funded within days of a hostile takeover attempt,
notwithstanding the fact that the target's CEO was the trustee of the
plan. 79 The target's board had discussed the possibility of adopting an
ESOP for a year prior to the hostile takeover attempt and the funding
was authorized four months prior to the beginning of the hostile stock
172. 761 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
173. See id. at 491-95.
174. Id. at 492.
175. Id. at 496.
176. Id. at 500.
177. 928 F.2d 1318, 1333 (2d Cir. 1991).
178. See, e.g., Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 633 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
179. See id. at 1068-69.
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acquisitions. 8" The court stated, "[t]here is every indication that [the
funding] was undertaken because the Board and management . ..
believed it would be a good thing for their corporation."' 81 Similarly, in
British Printing & Communication Corp. PLC v. Harcourt Brace Jova-
novich, Inc.,182 the court upheld contributions made to an ESOP pursu-
ant to a recapitalization plan that was adopted in response to a hostile
bid. Finding that a pre-existing ESOP had been adopted prior to the
hostile bid, the court concluded that the ESOP aspect of the recapitaliza-
tion plan was intended to increase employee productivity.' 83
Strategies Involving Economic Alternatives. A target can also com-
bat a hostile takeover attempt by offering its shareholders an economic
alternative to tendering through a recapitalization or restructuring. Such
economic alternatives are intended to provide immediate shareholder
value and, if the target remains independent, shareholders also retain a
long-term equity interest in the company.
Recapitalizations involve altering a corporation's capital structure.
One of the most common forms of recapitalization is the merger recapi-
talization. A merger recapitalization involves a merger and a subsequent
conversion of the shareholders' common stock into cash and common
stock in the newly formed corporation. Alternatively, a target can
engage in a reclassification recapitalization, in which the target, among
other things, converts its current common stock into preferred stock that
shareholders can redeem for cash and new common stock. In both
cases, shareholders profit in the short-term via an immediate cash pay-
ment, and benefit in the long-term by retaining an equity interest in the
corporation. By recapitalizing, a target can further make itself unattrac-
tive to a bidder by including provisions in its financing transaction docu-
ments that restrict the sale of corporate assets to pay off corporate debt,
requiring any would-be acquirer to have cash reserves to pay corporate
obligations.
Corporate restructuring often involves the sale of corporate divi-
sions or assets. One of the most common forms of defensive restructur-
ing includes spin-offs and split-offs. In a spin-off, the target creates an
independent entity out of one of its subsidiaries or businesses, or places
a portion of its most valuable assets in a newly-created corporation. The
target then distributes shares in the new entity to its shareholders. In a
split-off, the target sells off corporate assets or businesses, and distrib-
utes the proceeds to its shareholders.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1071.
182. 664 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
183. See id. at 1531.
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Another way to defeat a hostile bidder is for a target's management
to take a controlling or significant interest in the target by having the
target repurchase shares from the public. Shareholders typically benefit
from a repurchase plan not only from the value of the target's bid, but
also from the increased value of the outstanding stock after the repur-
chase plan is implemented. Share repurchases can also be implemented
as part of a recapitalization or restructuring strategy, or can be combined
with a white squire strategy. 8 4
Repurchase, recapitalization and restructuring plans are generally
upheld under the business judgment rule. In Polk v. Good, 85 the Dela-
ware Supreme Court upheld a corporation's repurchase of a block of its
shares at a three percent premium above market price, stating:
Unless the primary or sole purpose was to perpetuate the directors in
office, such an acquisition will be sustained if, after reasonable inves-
tigation, a board has a justifiable belief that there was a reasonable
threat to the corporate enterprise. When properly accomplished, such
matters are protected by the business judgment rule. 186
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 87 however,
illustrates that coercive repurchase plans will not be upheld. Anderson,
Clayton involved a "front-end loaded" self-tender offer by Anderson,
Clayton for 65.5 percent of its stock at sixty dollars per share, made in
response to a hostile tender offer for all of Anderson, Clayton's shares at
a concededly fair fifty-six dollars per share.1 88 The court enjoined the
self-tender offer, stating that it was not "reasonable in light of the
'threat' posed" because an Anderson, Clayton stockholder, "acting with
economic rationality, has no effective choice as between the contending
offers as presently constituted," and thus failed the second prong of the
Unocal test.' 89 According to the court, the self-tender failed the propor-
tionality requirement of Unocal because it created a situation in which
"no rational shareholder could afford not to tender into the Company's
self-tender offer," since the value of Anderson, Clayton stock would be
materially less than sixty dollars per share following consummation of
the self-tender. 0 ° Noting its "obvious entrenchment effect," the court
found the transaction "coercive," and enjoined it'on the grounds that it
constituted a "breach of a duty of loyalty."'' 91
184. See, e.g., In re Newmont Mining Shareholders Litig., 1988 WL 73750 (Del. Ch. July 15,
1988).
185. 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986).
186. Id. at 536-37.
187. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
188. Id. at 112.
189. See id. at 113-14.
190. Id. at 113.
191. Id. at 113-14.
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Sale of the Company. A target of a hostile takeover attempt can
offer its shareholders the economic alternative of selling to a favored
bidder, often called a "white knight." Various techniques are invoked to
enhance the likelihood of success of a white knight transaction.
"Lock-up" and "leg-up" options are stock options granted by the
target that confer an advantage on a favored bidder in order to facilitate
the favored bid. Lock-ups and leg-ups are used to entice the white
knight, and assist in promoting the white knight's bid by making the
target more expensive to a competing bidder. In a leg-up option, the
target gives the white knight the option to purchase a block of the tar-
get's stock (typically between ten and twenty percent) at the white
knight's offering price. This requires a disfavored bidder, if successful
in topping the favored bidder's price, to purchase the additional shares
represented by the option, while also giving the favored bidder a profit.
A lock-up option, on the other hand, gives the white knight an
advantage by transferring to the white knight a block of stock sufficient
to give it control of the target. Another common form of lock-up agree-
ment is the crown jewel asset option. If a target is concerned about an
imminent hostile takeover, it can provide a third party (the white knight)
the option to buy the target's most valuable assets or businesses (the
"crown jewels") at a favorable, yet supportable, price. This kind of
option may make the target significantly less attractive to a competing
bidder because the target no longer owns these valuable assets.
Under Revlon, when the target board has made a decision to sell the
corporation, lock-up, leg-up, and crown jewel options may only be used
to protect and benefit the shareholders. Accordingly, a lock-up agree-
ment must be used to facilitate, and not foreclose, competition in the sale
of the company. While Revlon and its progeny do not invalidate lock-up
agreements, those decisions appear to subject boards of directors enter-
ing into such agreements to increased obligations. Mills Acquisition Co.
v. MacMillan, Inc.,'92 for example, expanded on Revlon by demonstrat-
ing that, when the target's management is making a bid and occupies
seats on the board, lock-up options may be subject to an even higher
level of judicial scrutiny. The MacMillan court reiterated the principles
articulated in Revlon, stating that lock-up agreements "must confer a
substantial benefit upon the stockholders,"' 93 and their purpose must be
to secure a final offer that "materially [enhances] general stockholder
interests."' 194 The court went on to state that when "the intended effect
[of a lock-up agreement] is to end an active auction, at the very least the
192. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
193. Id. at 1284.
194. Id. at 1286.
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independent members of the board must attempt to negotiate alternative
bids before granting such a significant concession."', 95
In QVC Network Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc.,19 6 the
court found that a lock-up option given by Paramount to Viacom did not
satisfy the Revlon test. In QVC, the lock-up option at issue gave Viacom
the right to purchase almost twenty percent of Paramount stock for
approximately $1.6 billion, which Viacom could opt to pay with a
subordinated note instead of cash. Additionally, the lock-up option con-
tained a put provision that permitted Viacom to require Paramount to
pay Viacom the difference between the share option price and the mar-
ket price of Paramount's stock at the time the option was triggered, with
no cap limiting the maximum dollar value of the put. The court enjoined
the lock-up on the grounds that the note and put provisions were "poten-
tially 'draconian"' to Paramount and "unusual[ly] and highly beneficial"
to Viacom. 19
7
"Window shop" or "no shop" provisions are often included in
merger agreements involving the sale of the target company. These pro-
visions prohibit a target corporation from soliciting offers from bidders
after an agreement is reached with an acquirer, but permit the target to
consider unsolicited offers, provide information to later bidders upon
request, and accept later offers under certain circumstances. These pro-
visions usually permit the target board to consider firm competing bids
and terminate the merger agreement if the target directors are obliged to
do so in order to comply with their fiduciary duties. 19 8
Again, in Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 99
the court invalidated a no shop provision that, when combined with
other defensive provisions, prevented the directors "from carrying out
their fiduciary duties in considering unsolicited bids or in negotiating for
the best value reasonably available to the stockholders. ' 200 The no shop
provision at issue prohibited Paramount from "solicit[ing],
encourag[ing], discuss[ing], negotiat[ing], or endors[ing] any competing
transaction" with another bidder unless (i) it made "an unsolicited writ-
ten, bona fide proposal, . . .not subject to any material contingencies
relating to financing," and (ii) "Paramount['s] board determine[d] that
discussions or negotiations with the third party [were] necessary" for the
board to fulfill its fiduciary obligations. 201 In finding that the no shop
195. Id.
196. 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993), aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
197. Id. at 49, 39.
198. See Block, Hostile Acquisitions, supra note 137, at 21.
199. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994), aff'g 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993).
200. Id. at 49 n.20.
201. Id. at 39.
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provision prevented the directors from carrying out their fiduciary
duties, the court stated that "where a board has no reasonable basis upon
which to judge the adequacy of a contemplated transaction, a no-shop
restriction gives rise to the inference that the board seeks to forestall
competing bids. 20 2
In Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,2"3 on the other hand, the
court upheld a no shop provision that prohibited the corporation from
soliciting competing bids where the corporation's board retained the
power to "provide information to, and engage in discussions with, com-
peting bidders. ' 2°4 The court found that the allegation that the no-shop
clause "inhibit[ed] [the] board's ability to negotiate with other potential
bidders" was "not supported by the record. '" 20 5
Change of Control Employment Contracts. "Golden parachutes"
can also serve as a defensive measure. Golden parachutes are employ-
ment contract provisions that guarantee high ranking executives signifi-
cant employment, cash payment, or stock benefits in the event of a
change in corporate control. These contractual provisions are intended
to ensure that valued management will remain with the company even in
the face of uncertainty and instability resulting from a hostile takeover
situation. The effectiveness of golden parachutes as a defensive tactic,
however, is arguable since golden parachutes generally represent a small
fraction of the total dollar amount a bidder will expend in acquiring a
target, and an even smaller fraction of the target's worth. 20 6
Golden parachute arrangements are usually subject to a reasonable-
ness standard, which most courts evaluate under the business judgment
rule. Considerations include the amount of compensation; disinterested
director approval; and the factors that trigger the golden parachute, such
as a change in control, termination, or a change in duties. Generally,
provided no conflict of interest is found, golden parachute arrangements
will be upheld.20 7 Further, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 imposes tax
penalties on "excess parachute payments," which are defined as those
payments "contingent on a change of control" that are equal to or greater
than three times the employee's average annual taxable compensation
for the five years prior to the time of the change of control. 2 8 Any
excess parachute payments found are subject to a twenty percent excise
202. Id. at 49 n.20. (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989)).
203. 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
204. Id. at 1173.
205. Id. (citation omitted).
206. See BLOCK, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 637-40.
207. See Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 815 F.2d 76 (6th
Cir. 1987); see also BLOCK, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 658.
208. See 26 U.S.C. § 280G (1994); 26 U.S.C. § 4999 (1994).
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tax payable by the employee, and are not deductible by the corporation.
However, those payments reflecting reasonable compensation for per-
sonal services actually rendered will not be subject to the parachute pay-
ment tax penalties. 20 9 Thus, golden parachute arrangements should be
carefully drafted to reflect reasonable compensation for services ren-
dered to the corporation.
"Tin parachutes," severance agreements covering a larger number
of less senior executives or employees, can also serve to deter hostile
bids, provided the aggregate compensation value is significant. Like
golden parachute agreements, tin parachute arrangements generally are
subject to the business judgment rule provided they are implemented in
good faith and with a rational business basis. 210
Defensive Acquisitions. A target can also make defensive acquisi-
tions to make itself unattractive to would-be buyers or to create anti-
takeover impediments. 21 1 Alternatively, the target might acquire a busi-
ness that is at odds with the raider's business goals.
State Regulation. State anti-takeover statutes often provide in-state
corporations with additional protection against takeover attempts. State
anti-takeover statutes passed after Edgar v. MITE Corp.21 2 are some-
times referred to as "second-generation" statutes. In Edgar, the
Supreme Court struck down an Illinois anti-takeover statute intended to
hinder or prevent a hostile bidder from acquiring shares in the target
corporation. The Court found such statutes to be an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce.21 3
State statutes of the second-generation variety generally provide
protection by making unsolicited takeover attempts more difficult or
costly. For example, these statutes place voting restrictions on a would-
be raider's shares, require in fair price provisions that the acquiror pay
the same cash price for shares acquired in an initial tender offer as in a
back-end merger or inhibit a would-be raider from conducting a back-
209. See 26 U.S.C. § 280G(b)(4).
210. But see Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del.
1988), where the court enjoined the amendment of a series of retirement plans and the creation of
a new severance plan that incorporated a tin parachute payment of $130 million in employee
benefits following a change in corporate control. The definition of a change in control exempted a
management and employee-backed recapitalization plan, but not a competing tender offer. See id.
at 776. The court found that the directors' conduct triggered the Revlon duty to sell the company
to the highest bidder and that the $130 million benefit afforded the management and employee-
backed recapitalization plan over the competing tender offer improperly placed the two bidders on
unequal footing and thus constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. See id. at 786-87.
211. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (where Time
assumed approximately $10 billion of debt in a $13 billion acquisition of Warner).
212. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
213. See id. at 640-46.
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end merger. 211 While most state statutes operate to protect in-state cor-
porations, some statutes regulate takeover attempts of out-of-state corpo-
rations having a significant number of in-state shareholders or
operations.
The Delaware anti-takeover statute, for example, inhibits would-be
acquirers from conducting business consolidations. It imposes a three-
year waiting period on such transactions, unless the acquirer acquired
over eighty-five percent of the corporation's stock in the transaction in
which he became an interested party, the transaction is approved by the
board of directors and two-thirds of the shares not held by the acquirer
after the interested shareholders acquires his shares, or the transaction is
approved by the board prior to the interested shareholder's acquisi-
tion. 215 In comparison, New York's anti-takeover statute prohibits busi-
ness consolidations between the corporation and an interested
shareholder holding twenty percent or more of the corporation's stock
for five years after the interested shareholder's acquisition.21 6 Addition-
ally, after five years, fair price provisions restrict an interested share-
holder's ability to conduct back-end mergers and other consolidations
unless first approved by a majority of the disinterested shareholders.217
Many state anti-takeover statutes are a variation of the Delaware and
New York statutes, changing only the percent required to become an
"interested shareholder," or the waiting period required between the time
the shares are acquired and the time the business consolidation is insti-
tuted. For example, Wisconsin, Virginia, and Georgia define "interested
shareholder" as a ten percent shareholder, with Wisconsin and Virginia
imposing a three-year moratorium, and Georgia imposing a five-year
moratorium on such business consolidations.
IV. NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION V. CONRAIL INC.
Unocal and Revlon are Delaware cases establishing Delaware, not
federal or other states', standards for addressing a target's use of defen-
sive tactics. States are free to formulate statutes and develop case law
deviating from the Unocal and Revlon standards. Recently pending
before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
214. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & Ass'NS § 3-202 (1993 & Supp. 1996) (fair price
statute requiring acquirors of a corporation's stock to meet a statutory fair price before causing a
merger or other business combination under certain statutorily defined circumstances); 15 PA.
CON. STAT. ANN. § 1910 (1995) (cash-out statute requiring acquirors of 20 percent of the
outstanding stock of a corporation to give shareholders the right to sell their shares to the acquiror
for fair value, as defined by the statute).
215. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991).
216. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 912(c)(2) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1997).
217. See section 912(c)(3).
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was Norfolk Southern Corporation v. Conrail Inc., a case involving
Norfolk Southern Corporation's attempt to acquire Conrail Inc. and
challenge a merger agreement between Conrail and CSX Corporation.
In mid-October, 1996, Conrail and CSX entered into a merger
agreement valued at $7.8 billion, or eighty-six dollars per share. Shortly
thereafter, Norfolk Southern made a tender offer for Conrail valued at
$9.1 billion, or $100 per share, which offer was rejected by the Conrail
board of directors. Norfolk Southern subsequently increased its offer to
$110 per share.
Norfolk Southern alleged that the board of directors of Conrail, a
Pennsylvania corporation, breached its fiduciary duties (1) by refusing to
redeem a shareholder rights plan in favor of Norfolk Southern's tender
offer, (2) by failing to approve the Norfolk Southern tender offer under
the Pennsylvania Business Combination Statute, (3) by providing for a
termination fee of $300 million and a stock option with CSX in connec-
tion with the Conrail/CSX merger agreement, and (4) by agreeing to a
no shop provision that significantly limited Conrail's ability to entertain
other takeover proposals. Norfolk Southern moved to preliminarily
enjoin the Conrail/CSX merger, arguing, in part, that a board of directors
considering competing offers by potential acquirers should accept the
offer that gives shareholders the best price for their shares. At issue was
whether the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law exempts the Con-
rail board'sactions from the standards articulated in Unocal and Revlon
with respect to the competing tender offers by Norfolk Southern and
CSX.
The Pennsylvania statutes at issue grant to the board of directors
significant discretion in responding to tender offers and fundamental
changes.219 Comments to the statute explain that decisions regarding
merger and takeovers, including decisions regarding shareholder rights
plans, will be subject to "the generally applicable business judgment rule
... and not to some special rule created for situations involving a poten-
tial change of control. 22 °
The comments further suggest that sections 1715(a) and (b) limit
the board's fiduciary obligations to the corporation, and excuse directors
from the obligation to consider the interests of any particular group, such
as shareholders, as "dominant or controlling. ' 22I The comments state,
"[r]ejected by this subsection, therefore, are cases such as Revlon, Inc. v.
218. C.A. No. 96-CV-7167 (D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1996) (order denying preliminary injunction).
219. See 15 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. §§ 1502, 1715 (1995).
220. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1502(a)(18) (committee comment (1988)).
221. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(b) (committee comment (1988)).
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MacAndrews & Forbes, Inc.' '222 The comments also state that section
1715(c) of the Pennsylvania statute bars a determination that boards of
directors must redeem shareholder rights plans when change of control
issues are present. The comments to section 1715(c) explain that direc-
tors thus "have the statutory authority to 'just say no' with respect to a
potential or proposed acquisition. ' 2 3 Further, the comments state that
section 1715(c) intends that "directors' business conclusions with
respect to the actions covered by the subsection would ordinarily not be
subject to review."224
In addition, the comments suggest that section 1715(d) rejects Uno-
cal's enhanced scrutiny standard with regard to change of control trans-
actions, stating that "there shall not be any greater obligation to justify,
or higher burden of proof with respect to, any act as the board of direc-
tors, any committee of the board or any individual director relating to or
affecting an acquisition or potential or proposed acquisition of control of
the corporation than is applied to any other act as a board of direc-
tors. '225 The comments explain that "case law imposing a stricter stan-
dard or a heightened level of scrutiny with respect to director actions in
these circumstances ... is rejected by this subsection. 226 Not only does
section 1715(d) purport to reject Unocal's enhanced scrutiny standard,
according to the comments, it also creates a presumption that decisions
made by disinterested directors in the change of control context are
made in good faith after reasonable investigation, unless otherwise
demonstrated by "clear and convincing evidence. '227
In denying Norfolk Southern's motion to preliminarily enjoin the
Conrail/CSX merger, the court interpreted the Pennsylvania statute to
permit the directors of a target corporation to exercise business discre-
tion in taking action to protect a favored bidder, despite the fact that a
disfavored bidder is offering a substantially higher near term price for
the target's shares. 228 Rejecting the standards articulated in Unocal and
Revlon, the court found that the Pennsylvania statute was
enacted with the decisions of the Delaware State Courts and particu-
larly Unicol [sic] Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Corporation, and
Revlon, Incorporated v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Incorpo-
rated. . . clearly in mind and in order to exclude those in similar
222. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
223. 15 PA. CONST. STAT. § 1715(c) (committee comment (1988)).
224. 15 PA. CONST. STAT. § 1715(c) (committee comment (1988)).
225. Id. § 1715(d).
226. Id. § 1715(d).
227. Id. § 1715(d).
228. See Steven Lipin and Anna Wilde Mathews, CSX's Move to Derail Norfolk's Offer Has
Conrail Investors Feeling Railroaded, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1996, at Cl.
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decisions that seem to mandate or suggest that the primary or perhaps
only consideration in a situation where there is an attempted takeover
or a rival competition for a takeover or a merger between corpora-
tions is what is the best financial deal for the stockholders in the short
term.
229
Stating that Unocal and Revlon take a "myopic" view in giving share-
holder interests the "highest priority and importance" because they are
"at least in theory the owners of the corporation," the court found that
Unocal and Revlon err in replacing the business discretion of corporate
boards of directors with that of judges, who presumably are significantly
less sophisticated than directors as "practical business managers" of a
corporation. 230 Norfolk Southern thus demonstrates that, while the stan-
dards articulated in Unocal and Revlon currently predominate as stan-
dards for reviewing board action with regard to tender offers, states may
formulate statutes designed to give boards of directors the ability to act
in the best interests of the corporation, as opposed to the shareholders, as
well as statutes designed to protect boards of directors exercising busi-
ness judgment in good faith with regard to tender offers.
V. DEFENDING DEFENSIVE MANEUVERS: ADVANCE PREPAREDNESS
In today's era of increased shareholder activism, boards of directors
should be aware that conduct in response to an unsolicited takeover
attempt could be subject to shareholder criticism. For example, in
Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Serv., Inc., 231 certain sharehold-
ers conducted a proxy contest to limit the board's ability to retain a
shareholder rights plan and restrain other board action intended to avert
a hostile takeover attempt. A more recent example is CSX Corpora-
tion's attempt to acquire Conrail Inc. in a friendly transaction, while
certain shareholders protest that Norfolk Southern's hostile tender offer
provides a better price for Conrail shares. Shareholders also complain
that the Conrail/CSX proposal involves coercive techniques and exploits
Pennsylvania's anti-takeover statute.232 In light of the trend toward
shareholder activism, boards of directors should adopt corporate govern-
229. Norfolk S. Corp. v. Conrail, Inc., C.A. No. 96-CV-7167 at 647-8 (D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1996).
230. Norfolk Southern twice sought to enjoin the merger agreement. The second motion to
enjoin was premised on an amendment to the original merger agreement that extended the no-shop
exclusivity period to two years from 270 days. The court denied both motions. Norfolk Southern
appealed both of the court's orders, which were consolidated in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's order on the ground
that Norfolk Southern had failed to demonstrate irreparable injury. See Norfolk Southern Corp. v.
Ferrara, Nos. 96-2025 & 96-2026, Nos. 97-1006 & 97-1009 (3rd. Cir. Mar. 7, 1997).
231. 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
232. See Lipin and Mathews, supra note 228; Steven Lipin and Anna Wilde Mathews, Conrail
Board Meets Amid Expectations CSX Will Raise Offer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1996, at C16.
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ance practices that will assist them in demonstrating that they have satis-
fied their fiduciary obligations in the event that the corporation becomes
a target and the legality of pre- or post-offer defensive measures is
challenged.
In adopting such protective corporate governance practices, the
value of directors communicating with each other and with management
cannot be overstated. Materials should be distributed before meetings so
that directors are prepared to discuss issues. Directors should also peri-
odically discuss long-term corporate strategy and consult with legal and
financial advisors in pursuing the corporation's long-term business strat-
egy. Additionally, corporations are also well-advised to seat a majority
of independent directors on the board.
Unocal and its progeny demonstrate that target companies have sig-
nificant latitude to implement defensive strategies in preparation for or
in response to unsolicited takeover proposals. While boards of directors
are subject to a more exacting judicial scrutiny than that of the tradi-
tional business judgment rule where change of control issues exist, pro-
vided that directors act reasonably in an effort to protect and promote the
best interests of the shareholders, courts will be reluctant to override
informed corporate decision-making in that arena.
[Vol. 51:623
